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Abstract—Sensor networks offer the advantages of simple
and low–resource communication. Nevertheless, security is of
particular importance in many cases such as when sensitive
data is communicated or tamper-resistance is required. Updating
the security keys is one of the key points in security, which
restrict the amount of data that may be exposed when a key
is compromised. In this paper, we propose novel key update
methods, and benefiting from stochastic model checking we
propose a novel method for determining optimal key update
strategies for custom network scenarios. We also present a case
study where an application in commercial building automation
is considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of data in transit in sensor networks is often
provided by encryption algorithms that rely on cryptographic
keys. Algorithms are assumed to be known by the attackers as
stated in Kerckhoffs’s principle, whereas the keys should be
kept secret. However, keys may get compromised over time,
therefore networks secured by encryption usually have the
notion of key update where the key in use is revoked, a new
key is established and distributed.
Wireless sensor networks present several challenges in
terms of cryptography. Most of the challenges arise from
the constrained resources on the sensor devices. Memory and
processing power limitations, as well as the demand for a
long battery life generally eliminate the use of public key
cryptography. Therefore, symmetric cryptography is widely
used [1]. Besides, key types can also be affected by the
limitations since pairwise keys (e.g. link keys) are more
resource-consuming than group keys or network keys. In this
study, we will focus on the symmetric network key updates.
Applications of quantitative analysis in the security domains
are rare, as it is usually difficult to quantify or even sim-
ulate the underlying problems. We employ stochastic model
checking techniques for reasoning about security, which allow
deeper insights than qualitative techniques or simulation alone
[2]. Using our beneficial modelling and analysis approach
we ask questions and get quantitative answers. In particular,
we focus on optimising key confidentiality, key recovery, and
efficiency of the key updates.
In this work, we present three main contributions: 1) we
propose four novel key update methods for wireless sensor net-
works which consider the trade-off between limited resources
and demand for security, 2) we propose a novel method for
determining the strategy and parameters for key update, and
present a case study, 3) we present a novel application of
stochastic model checking in the security domain. Besides,
we develop generic formal models for key update and allow
developers to assess individual security parameters for their
application scenarios.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
defines the key update problem in a sensor network setting.
We propose novel key update methods in Section III. In
Section IV, we propose our method for determining the best
key update strategy based on given requirements. Section V is
an appetizer to our formalization and quantitative verification
using stochastic model checking. We conclude after presenting
a case study on wireless sensor networks in Section VI.
II. THE KEY UPDATE PROBLEM
Given the usual resource limitations in sensor networks,
absolute security is often less important than quantifiable
trade-offs between security and performance. As security is
a qualitative concept, realistic analyses require results that
are valid with respect to the full behaviour of the systems
considered.
In the following sections we detail the key update problem
in ZigBee, followed by a discussion on the status quo.
A. Setting up the Scheme
We will use ZigBee for the running example and the
developments throughout the paper [3]. The latest specification
of ZigBee (ZigBee-2007) specifies a suite of security services
that includes methods for key establishment, key transport,
etc. Although each revision and supporting specifications (such
as stack and application profiles) roll out improvements, key
update strategies and proper determination of related security
parameters still remain gaps in the ZigBee standard [4].
Naturally, we want to ensure that the risk of using a
compromised security key in a ZigBee network is as small
as possible – and this calls for updating the key fairly often.
On the other hand, this operation is computationally expensive
and we would not like to perform it too often. Unfortunately,
the ZigBee specification does not give any advice on this (i.e.
how and when the key shall be updated) – it merely states
that the security key shall be updated. The ZigBee Smart
Energy Application Profile, being one of the most critical
and important profiles, goes one step further and states that
periodically the trust center shall update the network key.
We present the key points that are necessary for a clear
understanding of the development below, and omit all the
details which are irrelevant to this study. A more detailed
discussion of ZigBee security can be found in [4] and surely
the ultimate source is the ZigBee documentation (i.e. the
specification [3], stack profiles, and application profiles).
ZigBee uses symmetric encryption, AES standard with 128
bits keys, therefore all the security keys are symmetric. A
Network Key (NK) is the mere mandatory key in a ZigBee
network, which is shared amongst all the devices and used
to secure broadcast communications. A Trust Center (TC),
creates and distributes the NKs. TC is an application running
on a ZigBee device, that is unique in every ZigBee network.
As a key component of ZigBee security, the TC is assumed
to run on a more powerful device (e.g. a coordinator) rather
than a regular ZigBee end device. Two more types of security
keys may exist in a ZigBee network depending on the security
configuration: Master Key and Link Key. Unlike NK, those
keys are pairwise shared. In this study we focus on NK as the
key type and refer to it as the key, and we assume that the
devices in the network already acquired the key.
The details of the NK update protocol is given in the
specification and explained in [4]. However, this protocol does
not specify when to update NK, which is what we are focusing
on in this paper. We assume that when TC updates the key,
all the devices in the network successfully update their keys.
Compromise of a NK affects all the devices in a network.
TC is fully responsible of creating and distributing the NK,
therefore there is no role of the devices in NK establishment.
B. Status Quo and Related Work
The notion of key update is often assumed to be periodical,
and even ZigBee – as a fairly promising standard – is no
exception. From now on we will refer to the periodical
updating method as Time-based key update (TB). TB does not
consider any source of key compromise, its mere concern is the
time passed. Therefore it cannot easily be fitted to a specific
network that has properties related to number of messages,
number of joining/leaving devices etc.
Now let us illustrate the relation between the key update
period and the number of key compromises with an example.
In Fig. 1, we present three instances using TB where we keep
everything else but the update threshold constant. The labels
on the left of the time-lines indicate the update period in
months, e.g. M=1 means the key is updated monthly; and the
update points are denoted by little bars. Since the distributions
are the same, we have the key compromise event in the
same time point regardless of the key update threshold. The
first key compromise named as C1 is common to all three
instances, as it happens in the first month after the network
(or observation of the network) starts. Showing the period
when the key is compromised by dotted lines, we observe
that a key compromise lasts longer as the update threshold
increases. Then in the second month, we observe another key
compromise only in M=1. This key compromise is not visible
in the other cases since their keys are already compromised.
This little example shows that the decrease in the number of
key compromises is misleading since the total period of time
when the key is compromised gets larger.
Fig. 1. Number of key compromise for different thresholds in TB
At this point we have to explain two standard notions
of secrecy. Forward secrecy implies that compromise of the
current key should not compromise any future key, whereas
backward secrecy implies that compromise of the current key
should not compromise any earlier key. While we have already
assumed these properties in our study, Wallner et al. suggested
that a shared key has to be updated on every membership
change and redistributed to all authorized members securely
to provide backward and forward secrecy [5]. This actually
resembles the key update methods we will propose in the
next section, however being an all-or-nothing approach lacks
flexibility to be suitable to low-resource networks.
The effect of periodic key exchanges to the performance
in an IEEE 802.15.4 network was discussed in [6]. They
proposed a new key update method, which we will refer to
as Message-based key update (MB) in this paper. However,
their study was not about network keys but link keys, which
are pairwise shared between devices. This approach counts the
number of communicated messages and issues a key update
after a certain number of messages communicated. MB does
not consider leaving (and joining) devices, therefore is not
aware of a device leaving the network while still holding a
valid key. In this study, we assume MB for NKs (but not for
link keys as in [6]) so that it can be comparable with other
methods in the paper.
III. PROPOSED METHODS FOR KEY UPDATE
In this section we will explain our four novel methods
for key update. Including the two update methods we have
previously explained (TB and MB), we will have six methods
to be used in the case study.
A. Leave-based Key Update (LB)
This method is considering the leave events in the network.
The key is updated after a predefined number of devices leave
the network. In practice, when a device leaves the network
it may still own a valid key, hence a device leave presents a
security risk. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel
key update strategy that we propose in [7]. A counter in the
Trust Center keeps track of the number of the devices left
(or removed from) the network. When this number reaches
the predefined threshold value, all the keys in the network are
updated and the counter is reset to zero. The idea here is to
have a key update strategy that is inspired by the nature of
the wireless sensor networks where the number of exchanged
messages can be relatively low and devices can be tampered
with by outside parties.
B. Join-based Key Update (JB)
This method is considering the join events in the network.
The key is updated after a predefined number of new devices
joins the network. A new device that joins the network presents
a security risk since it may become a legitimate attacker. For
example, the new device may have joined using an illegally
obtained network key, or a legitimate device can try to decrypt
old communication that it has captured before joining the
network. This strategy is also our own proposal, and the idea
is dual to LB. The key point here is, even though a device
leaving the network with valid key is a risk itself, the bigger
risk is when a new device joins after such a leave. Because
the new device could have somehow captured the key from
the previously leaving device. In this case, the counter would
contain the number of joining devices, and the threshold would
be set as a limit for this value.
C. Join-Leave-based Key Update (JLB)
In this method, the key is updated after a predefined number
of devices join or leave the network. We consider each join
and leave event as suspicious events and do not distinguish
between them. JLB is powered by both JB and LB key update
strategies therefore exhibiting the strength of these two. Since
both join and leave events are considered, the threshold value
is more sensitive than JB or LB.
D. Hybrid Key Update (Hy)
In the Hy method, we will employ multiple key update
strategies, and issue the update whenever any of the update
counters reaches its threshold. All the counters will be reset as
the key is updated. In this way, we will be able to benefit from
all useful key update strategies. Naturally, each key update
strategy has a different strength e.g. performing well when too
many leaves happen, or too many messages communicated,
or the environment has less malicious activity, etc. In the
hybrid key update strategy we will have all these strengths,
with the cost of more computational power. Therefore we will
suggest the hybrid key update to be used in networks where
the coordinator device has sufficient resources. For example,
if the coordinator device is a mobile computer or a powerful
handheld then we can implement the hybrid strategy. Note
that we did not include JLB in Hy, since it is limiting a real
hybrid phenomenon and in Hy we want to observe leave and
join events separately.
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING KEY
UPDATE STRATEGIES
In this section, we will build a methodology that deter-
mines the best key update strategy based on the security and
performance requirements of a network. We will first discuss
key confidentiality and recovery from a key compromise, then
continue with efficiency. After this discussion on what kind
of requirements can be set and what kind of answers can be
gathered, we will propose our methodology.
A. Optimizing Key Confidentiality
Using formal models, we can obtain the probability of
being in a state where the key is compromised at a specific
time instant. In this way, we also show that stochastic model
checking can be efficiently used in determining the most
appropriate key update threshold (e.g. time period) for an
intended security level. As an example we may answer the
question:
What is the probability that the key is compromised
6 months from now?
by computing the transient probability of the key being com-
promised.
Obviously the answer depends on how often we are chang-
ing the key and we shall therefore pose the questions for
different replacement strategies.
Naturally, we are also interested in the preservation of
confidentiality in the long-run or equilibrium. In this case,
the question to be asked is:
What is the probability of the key being compromised
in the long run?
Using stochastic model checking, we can obtain the steady-
state probability of key compromise for different key update
thresholds.
Surely the results of the two questions above shed light on
how the key update strategy influences the risk of the key
being compromised over time. But offhand they do not really
give the solution to our problem. So let us ask a more direct
question:
What is the best replacement strategy if it is accept-
able that the probability of the key being compro-
mised is 10%?
We can answer such questions and return a solution set.
However, if the solution set is not a singleton then we may
need to narrow the solution set by other criteria as we define
in the following sections.
We can define two metrics as we illustrated above: average
risk and maximum risk.
B. Optimizing Mean Time To Recover
A security key may get compromised for several reasons,
and eventually it will be updated. However, the time needed
to recover from a compromised key needs to be optimized in
such a way that the network is not without protection for a
long time period. Thus, we are interested in the mean time to
recover (MTTR) from a compromise of the key. Rather than
formally defining it, we will illustrate by an example in Fig.
2.
Assume that we design a ZigBee network, where each
device has a valid network key for secure communication.
Independent of the key update strategy, we can safely assume
that the network key will be updated after some time. In fig.
2, we label the starting time of the network as start and a
solid line following the start corresponds to the time where the
network key is safe, i.e. not compromised. Then, we observe a
thick cross on the solid line that represents a key compromise,
we label this time point as C1. After point C1, the line is no
more solid but dotted which means that the valid network
key is compromised, therefore the communication might not
be secure anymore. Note that any key comprising event after
C1 and before the soonest update won’t make any changes
because the key is already compromised. After some triggering
event depending on the type of the key update strategy we
will have a key update, labelled as update. At update points,
compromised key is revoked and devices start using a new and
fresh network key. The time periods we have labelled as R1 and
R2 in Fig. 2, refer to the time period between the time point
that a fresh key become compromised, and the time point that
it is recovered by a key update a recovery time. Naturally, the
summation of all these recovery times divided by the number
of recoveries will give us the MTTR value.
Fig. 2. Mean Time to Recover
Using our formal model and stochastic model checking we
can compute the expected MTTR, up to a certain time bound.
Which will result in the answer to this question:
What is the mean time to recover from a compro-
mised key?
It is important to have an optimum key update strategy and
update threshold such that the MTTR value will be as small
as possible. However, a too small MTTR value requires too
high power consumption which might not be acceptable for
networks that have devices with a limited power capacity.
No doubt, MTTR needs to be optimized in such a way that
the network is not without protection for a long time period.
If it is a short time then a potential malicious attacker will not
have sufficient time to launch the attack whereas if it is a long
time then the risk will be considerable higher for a successful
attack. However, it is also important not to face a compromised
key situation that is longer than a specified time bound. Thus,
we are also interested in the risk that it takes more than a
specific amount of time to recover from a compromised key.
As an example we may answer the question:
What is the probability that the key has not been
replaced 3 months after it was compromised?
Thus, we define two metrics as we illustrated above: MTTR
and maximum recovery time.
C. Optimizing Key Update Efficiency
One of the many important issues related to the key updates
is the power consumption. Whenever we are replacing the
key we are consuming power, and it is certainly interesting to
compare the number of key updates performed over a certain
period in different settings. Clearly, if we replace the key
every 6 months then it is easy to see that we are updating
the key twice a year. But how many times are we updating
the key a year if we replace it whenever 10 devices have left
the network? We can pose this question to our analysis:
How many key replacements can we expect to have
performed a year from now?
We succeed to compute the number of expected key updates
in our analysis using the reward structures in our formal model.
To demonstrate how this analysis can tighten the bounds of
thresholds when looking for the best strategy, we will pose
the question:
What is the best strategy if we on average can afford
1 key update per year?
We also investigate the extent to which key updates trig-
gered by the various threshold values are indeed needed, that
is, will the key really be compromised when the updates occur.
We shall classify the key updates as useful and useless updates.
A useful update is a key update that is applied after a key gets
compromised, therefore recovering the key. Similarly, a useless
update is a key update that was not necessary because the
key was not compromised. Naturally, we want the percentage
of useless updates to be as small as possible because a key
update is a costly action for ZigBee devices. In other words,
the question we will try to answer is:
What is the best strategy if we expect to have at least
10% useful updates?
We can define metrics as: tolerated number of updates
and percentage of efficient updates.
D. Determining Optimum Method and Threshold
Obviously, it is not trivial to derive conclusion from the
stochastic model checking results on the key update regarding
confidentiality, recovery, and efficiency. For instance, the more
efficient configuration is not the more secure one. To overcome
such dilemmas, designers should decide on the priorities of
the system and select appropriate security parameters. In this
section, we propose a methodology for deciding the optimum
key update strategy and key update threshold.
The first step is determining the characteristics of the ap-
plication. Namely, we specify the application scenario, which
depends on the type of the sensor devices and the objectives
of the network. To choose the application scenario is fairly
easy in ZigBee, because the ZigBee specification already
has specialized application profiles that the designers and
developers are supposed to make use of. This step will result
in the values of parameters that we use in formal model.
Next comes the requirements about security and perfor-
mance. Certainly, an extra key update causes an unwanted
power consumption and therefore would drain the batteries
earlier than expected. After carefully specifying the require-
ments, we can exploit stochastic model checking on finding
answers to our questions. At this point, picking a collection
of different key update strategies and a set of threshold values
would make everything easier. Model checking results will
point us the appropriate threshold values if they exist, and of
course different behaviours of different key update strategies.
After getting all the information above, it remains to evalu-
ate all the solutions for all the requirements and conclude on
the solution that satisfies all the requirements. Hence, a simple
algorithm can be defined as:
I Set the requirements using the metrics we defined
II Set the capabilities i.e. key update methods and thresholds
III Compute the solution set i.e. for each method find threshold
values that satisfy all the requirements
IV If the solution set is empty or has multiple elements refine the
requirements or capabilities and go to step III, else return the
solution
In Section VI, we present a case study that shows how we
can get advice from stochastic model checking. In addition, it
might be seen as a comparison between different key update
methods and we observe how a method can beat another when
different environment conditions and requirements exist.
V. QUANTITATIVE VERIFICATION
Stochastic model checking is an automatic technique for
verification and performance analysis of stochastic systems.
In the networking perspective, one application of this method
is equivalent to a sufficient number of simulation runs, as it
covers the full behaviour of the model and delivers provably
correct results.
In the quantitative verification of all the key update methods
considered, we did necessary abstraction as needed for formal
verification. We formalized each method into a formal model,
where network and trust center are modelled diligently. In the
network module, we focus on events such as devices joining,
leaving, and messaging. We consider that leaving devices
and the messaging may cause key compromises. In the trust
center module, we implement the key update strategy which is
usually based on counting events and updating the key when
a threshold is exceeded.
We designed our formal models to be stochastic, as we have
events with stochastic delays such as device leave, device join,
messaging etc. We developed continuous-time Markov chain
(CTMC) models for each of the key update methods. The
models we developed are both easy to customize, and compact
enough to allow model checking. We specified the properties
that we want to validate, in a stochastic temporal logic, CSL
[8]. Thus, we are able to answer the questions by checking if
the properties satisfied and getting quantitative answers. The
stochastic model checking is fully automated using the well-
established stochastic model checker PRISM [9].
All the models and properties that are relevant to this paper
and sufficient to replicate the case study are available in [10].
VI. CASE STUDY
In this case study, we focus on commercial building au-
tomation, specifically hotel security management. We consider
a system where we use wireless sensors embedded in door
locking cards which allow remote cancellation of cards, remote
report of door lock status and door ajar alarms, etc.
The technical details of such a system in our perspective
includes a maximum number of 50 devices in the network,
aiming to keep the network at its maximum size as much
as possible, replacing stolen or broken cards in two days on
average, each device having non-stop operation for a year on
average, each device sending one message a day on average,
and the probability of a compromisation action by either
devices leaving or by messages sent is one in ten thousand.
We use all the key update methods we mentioned in this
paper, with the exception that the hybrid method was modified
such that it does not include MB, so we denote it by Hy/mb.
To keep the case study tractable, we will set two solid
requirements here:
R1: The key compromise probability should be below 5% in
the long run.
R2: Maximum allowed number of key updates is 35 per year.
Key compromise in the long run: We start by computing
the steady-state probabilities for a moderate set of thresholds.
Actually, the aim here is to find the set of thresholds for each
key update method that satisfies R1. As shown in Fig. 3, we
assumed that the devices were capable of supporting a simple
set of threshold values: {1,2,3,4,5} for TB, LB, JB, JLB;
{500,1000,1500,2000,2500} for MB; and {(1-1-500),(2-2-
1000),(3-3-1500),(4-4-2000),(5-5-2500)} for Hy/mb. To keep
the graphical results more readable, the x-axis is shared by all
the key update strategies such that for MB and Hy/mb it is
used like an index to a threshold value. For example, the point
2.0 on the x-axis means threshold value of 2 for JLB, 1000
for MB, and (2-2-1000) for Hy/mb.
Even though it is evident in Fig. 3 which thresholds satisfy
R1, we can still discuss the results to get more insight. In
this sense, the interpretation of the first part of Fig. 3 is:
a) TB has very high key compromise probability for the
specified threshold set, b) JLB has the best results with only
one exception where the threshold values are minimum (and
number of key updates are boosted), c) the results of JB and
LB are so close that the green colored line of JB is not
visible under LB’s blue line; however LB performs slightly
better (approximately 0.015% difference), d) JB, LB, MB, and
Hy/mb are in a competition where Hy/mb is winning and MB
is losing as the threshold values get larger.
Number of key updates: In this criteria, we compute the
expected number of key updates after 12 months. We present
the results in the second part of Fig. 3. On the y-axis we have
the expected number of updates, and naturally the number of
key updates should decrease as the thresholds increase.
Interpretation of the second part of Fig. 3 is: a) JLB has
high key update numbers for the specified threshold set, b)
TB has minimum number of updates, c) again JB and LB
perform very similar, and as expected this time JB performs
slightly better, d) and again JB, LB, MB, and Hy/mb are in a
competition but their results tend to converge as the threshold
values get larger.
Fig. 3. Quantitative results, Left: Key compromise probability in the long run (R1), Right: Number of key updates in one year of time (R2)
Solution set: Now that we have our results above, we can
compute the solution sets for each requirement:
SR1={LB1, JB1, JLBi, MBj , Hyj | 1≤ i≤3, 1≤j≤2}
SR2={LBi, JBi, JLBj , MBi, Hyj , TBk | 2≤ i≤ 5,
3≤j≤5, 1≤k≤5}
Each key update strategy has a solution inside both R1 and
R2, except TB which can not satisfy R1 at all. Then it is easy
to find the intersection of the solution sets such that:
SR1&R2={JLB3, MB2}
As seen above, only two settings satisfied our requirements
in the end: Join-Leave-based key update with a threshold of
3 devices, and Message-based key update with threshold of
1000 (notice that index 2 means threshold 1000 in MB).
Now we can investigate further details, such as transient
key compromisation probability. We know the steady-state
probabilities of these two settings from Fig. 3 (0.044 for JLB3,
and 0.048 for MB2), but we don’t know the behaviour of
those settings before they get stabilized, therefore transient
probabilities will be very useful to know. In Fig. 4, we present
the results for compromised key at monthly time instants for
JLB3 and MB2. Fig. 4 supplies good insight and interesting
results indeed, such as MB2 has an alternating pattern where
the maximum points increase for almost a year and then start to
decrease; at the same time the minimum probabilities decrease
for almost two years and then start to increase. In contrast
with that, JLB3 has a very consistent result and seems as the
best choice considering that the deviation from the steady-state
probability is almost negligible.
Fig. 4. Key compromise probability at monthly time instants
Although we are happy with the results of JLB3 where we
don’t see jumps in the probability, we may also investigate
more thoroughly. If we check daily time instants instead of
monthly ones, the results verify that even in day level JLB3
does not allow peaks, and still is very consistent (figure is
omitted due to lack of space).
Result: Using our approach we conclude that the Join-
Leave-based key update strategy with threshold value 3 is the
optimum solution for this key update problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the problem of updating the
cryptographic keys in wireless sensor networks. We have
proposed new methods for key update, and a methodology
for determining the optimum key update strategy in terms of
confidentiality and power consumption. Furthermore, we have
presented how stochastic model checking can be applied to the
network security area and be useful in quantitative analysis of
security. We believe that our study may assist sensor network
applications in having higher security for lower costs.
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